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Freya Kodar*

Conceptions of Borrowers and Lenders in the
Canadian Payday Loan Regulatory Process:
The Evidence from Manitoba and Nova Scotia

Commentators characterize thinking aboutpayday loans as falling into two general
perspectives. In one theory payday loans respond to market demand and are a
sensible choice for a consumer with limited assets, credit, or other support when
an unexpected financial need arises. The opposing theory holds that the loans
are usurious and exploit vulnerable low-income borrowers. In 2007, amendments
were passed exempting payday loans from the application of the criminal interest
rate provisions of the Criminal Code if they were made by companies licensed
by a province with a regulatory scheme. The author examines how federal and
provincial lawmakers and administrative decision-makers understood payday
loans and those who use them, and how the conceptualizations of borrowers
and the industry are reflected in the regulatory regimes that emerged. To do this
the author considers the federal legislative debates about the Criminal Code
amendments and the subsequent cost-setting decisions in Manitoba and Nova
Scotia, the first two provinces to regulate payday lending. Despite Manitoba's
focus on more vulnerable borrowers, she concludes that, assessed as a whole,
the regulatory regimes better correspond to the "market demand" school of
thought about payday loans.
D'aprbs les commentateurs, les opinions concernant les prcts sur salaire
peuvent 6tre r6parties en deux grandes perspectives: d'un c~td, les prdts sur
salaire rdpondent & une demande du marchd et sont un choix sens6 pour les
consommateurs qui ont peu d'actifs, un mauvais dossier de credit ou n'ont pas
d'autres recours en cas de besoin financier imprdvu. De I'autre ca5d, ces pr~ts
sont usuraires et exploitent les emprunteurs vulndrables &faible revenu. En 2007,
des modifications ont dtd apportdes &la loi pour exempter les prdts sur salaire de
l'application des dispositions sur les taux d'int6rdt criminels du Code criminel s'ils
sont offerts par des entreprises d6tentrices d'un permis provincial 6mis en vertu
d'un regime rdglementaire. L'auteure 6tudie la connaissance que les Idgislateurs
f6ddral et provinciaux et les ddcideurs administratifs avaient des pr~ts sur
salaire et de ceux qui y ont recours, et la fagon dont les conceptualisations des
emprunteurs et de l'industrie sont refletdes dans les rdgimes de rdglementation
qui ont suivi. Pour ce faire, I'auteure examine les ddbats /dgislatifs f~ddraux
sur les modifications au Code criminel et les ddcisions ulterieures quant i la
ddtermination des cot~ts prises au Manitoba et en Nouvelle-Ecosse, les deux
premidres provinces j r6glementer les pr~ts sur salaire. En ddpit des prdcautions
prises par le Manitoba relativement aux emprunteurs les plus vulndrables,
I'auteureconclut que lorsqu'ils sont dvaluds dans leur ensemble, les rdgimes de
rdglementation penchent du catd de I'6cole de pensde qui entend rdpondre a la
demande du march6 pour ce qui est des pr~ts sur salaire.
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and Judy Fudge, Karen Pearlston, and Mary Anne Waldron for their comments. I also thank the
National Centre for Business Law for a grant which helped fund the research assistance for this
project.
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Introduction
A significant area of recent regulatory activity in the Canadian consumer
protection field has been with respect to payday loans. Until recently these
loans were "regulated" by the 60% cap on interest in section 347 of the
Criminal Code-the criminal interest rate provisions.' Although payday
loan borrowers have regularly paid interest and fees that together amount
to well over 60% per annum, payday loan providers have rarely been
prosecuted. In 2007, amendments were passed exempting short-term (less
than 62 days) loans of $1500 or less from the application of section 347
if they are made by companies licensed by a province with a regulatory
scheme "that protect[s] recipients of payday loans and.. .limits.. .the total
cost of borrowing." 2 In making these amendments the federal government
effectively transferred regulatory authority over payday lenders to
provinces that enact legislation. To date, most provinces have passed
legislation, although it is not in force in all the jurisdictions. Generally
the regulatory scheme has been incorporated within existing consumer
protection statutes.
Ruth Berry and Karen Duncan characterize thinking about payday
loans as falling into two general "schools of thought" or perspectives.'
Roughly speaking, payday loans either respond to market demand, and are
a sensible choice for a consumer with limited assets, credit, or other support
when an unexpected financial need arises.' Or the loans are exploitative
and usurious, and vulnerable low-income consumers will "fall prey to
them."' This paper looks at how lawmakers and administrative decisionmakers understood payday loans and those who used them, and how they
articulated the purpose of the new regulatory regime. To do this I examine
the debates about the Criminal Code amendments at the federal level,
and decisions about the substance of key elements of the new regime by
two provincial administrative bodies: the Manitoba Public Utilities Board
I. RSC 1985, c C-46.
2.
Ibid at s 347.1 (3), as amended by An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal interest rate),
SC 2007, c 9.
3.
Ruth E Berry & Karen A Duncan, "The Importance of Payday Loans in Canadian Consumer
Insolvency" (October 2007) Report Prepared for the Insolvency Research Initiative, Office of the
Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/vwapj/
Payday EN.pdf/$file/Payday_EN.pdf> at 3. See also Maximum Chargesfor Payday Loans (4 April
2008) Order No. 39/08, online: MPUB <http://www.pub.gov.mb.ca/pdf/misc/39-08.pdf> at 121-22
[Maximum Charges]; Paul Bowles, Keely Dempsey & Trevor Shaw, "Fringe Financial Institutions,
the Unbanked and the Precariously Banked: Survey Results from Prince George, B.C." (September
2010) Report Prepared for the Aboriginal Business Development Centre at 5-6 (copy on file with the
author).
4.
Berry & Duncan, supra note 3 at 5-8.
Ibid at7.
5.
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(MPUB) and the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB).
Manitoba and Nova Scotia were the first two provinces to regulate payday
lending. These boards were responsible, at least initially, for setting the
limits on the cost of borrowing and charges and interest on default, as
well as making recommendations about regulatory amendments. I am
interested in thinking about how the conceptualization of borrowers and
the industry in the regulatory debates is reflected in the regulatory regimes
that emerged.
I have chosen to look at the federal legislative debates and the utility
boards' decisions because they all draw on, refer to, and interpret oral and
written submissions from consumers and industry. Moreover, analysis of
legislative debates provides both an interpretative tool for understanding
the legislation,' and "offer(s) a glimpse of the public justifications
employed by... [Parliamentarians] when discussing policy decisions."'
Similar arguments can be made about examining the two rate-setting
bodies' decisions.
In addition, the.administrative decisions provide insights into the ways
in which the legislation, which mandated the respective boards to consider
the interests of payday borrowers and lenders in making an order that is
"just and reasonable in the circumstances"' was subsequently applied.
There is another pragmatic reason for focusing on the decisions generated
by these two regulatory bodies rather than the individual submissions to
them. The NSUARB provides access to the documents submitted, but
hearing transcripts are not publicly available online. Conversely, the
MPUB provides online access to transcripts, but not to the documents.
Therefore, the decisions are the only comparable texts.
The first section of the paper provides an overview of payday loans
in Canada. The second section looks at the regulatory history leading
up to the Criminal Code amendments. It focuses on the ways in which
consumers and lenders and those who represented them responded to the
regulatory scheme in place before the amendments, how they characterized
payday loan borrowers and the industry, and how they articulated the
vulnerabilities and risks created by the previous regulatory regime.
6.
Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation,2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 279-90; St6phane
Beaulac, "Recent Developments at the Supreme Court of Canada on the Use of Parliamentary
Debates" (2000) 63 Sask L Rev 581.
7.
Andrew Woolford & Jasmine Thomas, "Exception and Deputization under Today's NDP: Neoliberalism, the Third Way, and Crime Control in Manitoba" (2011) 26 CJLS 113 at 119.
8.
Consumer ProtectionAct, RSNS, 1989, c 92, s 18T(5), as amended by An Act to Amend Chapter
92 of the Revised Statutes, 1989, the Consumer ProtectionAct, SNS 2006, c 25 [NSCPA]; Consumer
Protection Act, CCSM c C200, s 164(5) as amended by The Consumer Protection Amendment Act
(PaydayLoans), SM 2006, c 31 [MCPA 2006].
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The remainder of the paper examines the characterization of borrowers
and lenders, and the purpose(s) of the legislative regime in two contexts:
the federal legislative debates about the Criminal Code amendments and
subsequent cost-setting decisions in Manitoba and Nova Scotia. As it
turned out, these boards set the lowest and highest caps to date on the cost
of borrowing and other charges. The NSUARB also recently reviewed
its decision and reduced the maximum cost it set in 2008.9 This makes
Nova Scotia the first province to conduct a review of a fully implemented
payday loan regulatory regime.
In the last section I consider the understandings of the payday loan
industry and borrower reflected in the regulatory regimes that emerged.
Despite Manitoba's focus on more vulnerable borrowers, I conclude
that assessed as a whole, the regulatory regimes better correspond to the
"market demand" school of thought about payday loans. The industry is
seen as responding to consumer demand and filling a gap in the consumer
credit market. The borrower is understood to be an average consumer
freely choosing the loan and fully aware of its costs. Regulation is designed
to increase competition and ensure adequate disclosure about loan costs
and terms so that consumers can make informed choices. This will in turn
result in an efficient payday loan market.
In some ways this conclusion is not surprising given that the federal
government acted to permit lenders to charge what would otherwise be
criminal interest rates on loans in a province with a regulatory scheme
and a federal Cabinet "designation," and both Manitoba and Nova Scotia
chose to regulate and seek a designation. What is surprising is the extent
to which this understanding dominates the regimes, particularly in Nova
Scotia, because the divergent perspectives on the industry and borrowerswhat I refer to in the paper as the "market demand" and the "exploitative"
schools of thought-were present in the debates, the administrative
decisions, and the submissions considered in these processes. At all stages
of the regulatory process there was evidence supporting the conception of
the payday loan borrower as particularly vulnerable, with few choices and
at risk of exploitation. Moreover, both federal and provincial decisionmakers could have responded to both kinds of borrower/consumer, yet
implemented only a limited number of the measures recommended to
protect more vulnerable borrowers.

9.

2011 NSUARB 22 at para 114 [NSUARB 2011].
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I. Payday loans
1. Overview
Payday loans are relatively small loans given in exchange for a postdated cheque or a pre-authorized withdrawal from a bank account in the
amount of the loan plus interest and any other fees. They are part of a
range of financial services available in the "alternative financial sector"
(AFS).'o In addition to payday loans, the AFS provides services such
as cheque-cashing, rent-to-own purchases, and pawnbroking. Services
are usually targeted towards those with lower incomes or poor credit
histories." Payday loan companies first appeared in the 1990s, and have
rapidly expanded to include approximately 1,600 outlets nationwide. 2 In
2008 approximately 4,330,000 payday loans were issued." Payday loans
generally range from $100 to $1,000, with the average loan being $280
for a 10 day period.' 4 The interest and fees charged vary, but as an annual
percentage rate (APR) are well above the 60% limit set by section 347."
For purposes of comparison, the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada
(FCAC) gives examples of credit card interest rates ranging from 12% to
19%.16 Interest rates for unsecured personal lines of credit are generally
lower. '7
Borrowers take out payday loans for a variety of reasons. They
might (1) be unable to get cheaper forms of credit such as a line of credit,
credit card, or overdraft protection'"; (2) live in a community not served
10. lain Ramsay, "The Alternative Consumer Credit Market and Financial Sector: Regulatory Issues
and Approaches" (2001) 35 Can Bus L 325 at 333-34.
11. Ibid at 334.
12. Canadian Payday Loan Association, "Our Mandate," online: <http://www.cpla-acps.ca/english/
aboutmandate.php> [CPLA, "Mandate"]. See also Andrew Kitching & Sheena Starky, Parliamentary
Information and Research Service, Payday Loan Companies in Canada: Determining the Public
Interest (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2006) at 4.
13. Maximum Charges, supra note 3 at 38.
14. Wendy Pyper, "Payday Loans" (2007) 8:4 Perspectives on Labour and Income 5 at 6; Canada
Payday Loan Association, "What is a payday loan and who uses it?" online: <http://www.cpla-acps.
ca/english/mediabackgroundersI.php> [CPLA, "What is a payday loan?"].
15. See, e.g., Ramsay, supranote 10 at 344; Association of Community Organizations for Reform
Now (ACORN) Canada, Protecting Canadians' Interest: Reining in the Payday Lending Industry
(Vancouver, BC: ACORN, 2004) at 32-33 (Appendix 2) [ACORN, Protecting Canadians'Interest];
Affordable Payday Loans v Firth et al, [2005] OJ no 1232 (Ct J (Gen Div Sm Cl Ct)) [Affordable v
Firth]. The current costs in provinces regulating the industry range from $17 per $100 in Manitoba to
$25 per $100 in Nova Scotia: PaydayLoans Regulation, Man Reg 99/2007, s 13.1(1); NSUARB 2011,
supranote 9 at 2.
16. "Choosing the Right Credit Card for You", online: <http://www.fcac-acfc.gc.ca/eng/resources/
publications/PaymentOptions/RightCC/RightCC-3-engasp>.
17. "Shopping Around for a Line of Credit", online: <http://www.fcac-acfc.gc.caleng/resources/
publications/banking/TSLineCredit-eng.asp>. See also Maximum Charges, supranote 3 at 6.
18. Pyper, supra note 14 at 5.
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by mainstream banks 9; and/or (3) like the borrowing process, location,
and hours of payday loan outlets.20 Borrowers do not operate completely
outside the mainstream financial sector though, as they must have a bank
or credit union account.2 1
Statistics Canada recently started tracking payday loan use. Its 2005
Survey of Financial Security asked about their use in the previous three
years. Less than 3% of families surveyed had taken out payday loans.
Those that were more likely to have used one included young families;
low income families with few assets; renters; those who did not have credit
cards, or who were unable to pay down credit card balance(s); those who
were behind in bill payments, including rent/mortgage payments; those
who had already tried to sell or pawn an asset; and those who did not
have anyone they could ask for help in a time of unexpected financial
difficulty. 22 More than 25% of those who had used a payday loan indicated
they would not be able to handle an unexpected expense of $500, while
almost 50% said they would not be able to do so for one of $5,000.23
In another survey, only 48% of payday loan borrowers surveyed
understood that the interest they were paying was more than the interest
on a credit card purchase.24 The MPUB estimated that the average payday
borrower takes out four to six loans a year.25 In short, those who use payday
loans tend to be more vulnerable consumers in terms of their ability to
access credit in the mainstream financial system or to cover basic living
costs without incurring or increasing their debt.
2. Regulatory history
The payday loan industry is not subject to the legislative schemes governing
mainstream deposit-taking institutions such as banks and credit unions. As
the industry grew, consumers and organizations such as the Public Interest
Advocacy Centre (PIAC) and the Association of Community Organizations

19. ACORN, Protecting Canadians'Interest,supra note 15 at 15; ACORN Canada, A Conflict of
Interest: How Canadas Largest Bankers Support Predatory Lending (Toronto: ACORN Canada,
2007) at 3.
20. Pyper, supra note 14 at 5. See also Kitching & Starky, supra note 12 at 2-3; Ipsos-Reid
Corporation, Public Experience with Financial Services and Awareness of the FCAC (Ottawa:
Financial Consumer Agency of Canada, 2005) at 11-12.
21. Maximum Charges, supra note 3 at 46-47. See also Bowles, Dempsey & Shaw, supra note 3 at
44-45.
22. Pyper, supra note 14 at 6-12.
23. Ibid at 10, 12.
24. Ipsos-Reid Corporation, supra note 20 at 18.
25. Maximum Charges,supra note 3 at 38.
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for Reform Now (ACORN), as well as government representatives, 26
became concerned about the vulnerability of many borrowers, the high
cost of loans, and a lack of transparency about loan terms and costs. 27 They
were also critical of the way practices such as "rollovers" and multiple
concurrent loan-holding pulled consumers into a cycle of increasing
debt.28 They called for comprehensive regulation of the industry and its

practices. 29
Although it is a criminal offence to charge or "receive interest at a
criminal rate" 3 0 there have been few prosecutions of payday lenders."
Instead the fact that lenders were charging criminal interest rates became
central to class action lawsuits brought by consumers against lenders for
unjust enrichment.3 2 The payday loan industry has vigorously defended
these actions.
The borrower at the centre of the consumer discourse was a vulnerable
one, with low-income and insecure employment, few (if any) savings
26. The Consumer Measures Committee, a committee with federal, provincial and territorial
representation, is mandated to work together on issues related to consumer protection and consumer
affairs. Its Working Group on the Alternative Consumer Credit Market began looking at improving
practices within the Alternative Consumer Credit Market, including payday loans, as early as 2000.
27. See, e.g., Sue Lott & Michael Grant, FringeLending and "Alternative" Banking: The Consumer
Experience (Ottawa: Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2002); Consumer Measures Committee
Working Group on the Alternative Consumer Credit Market, Consultation Paper on Framework
Options For Addressing Concerns with the Alternative Consumer CreditMarket (Consumer Measures
Committee, 2002); ACORN, Protecting Canadians'Interest,supra note 15.
28. If the borrower does not have sufficient funds to repay the loan, some lenders may allow him or
her to, for an additional fee, "rollover" the loan.
29. For overviews of the regulatory reforms proposed see, e.g., ACORN, Protecting Canadians'
Interests, supranote 15 at 26-28; John Lawford, PragmaticSolutions to Payday Lending: Regulating
FringeLending and "Alternative" Banking (Ottawa: Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2003) at 48-52.
30. Criminal Code, supra note I at s 347(1).
31. Maximum Charges, supra note 3 at 113-14. See also Consumer Measures Committee Working
Group, supra note 27 at 4.
32. See, e.g., MacKinnon v National Money Mart Co, 2006 BCCA 148; Bodnar v Cash Store Inc,
2010 BCSC 145. Lenders seeking to enforce the terms of a payday loan also ran the risk a court would
sever the interest and fees from the loan principal. See, e.g., Affordable v Firth, supra note 15. For
a discussion of recent payday loan litigation see generally Mary Anne Waldron, "A Brief History of
Interest Caps in Canadian Consumer Lending: Have We Learned Enough From the Past?" (2011) 50
CBLJ 300 at 309-15.
33. As National Money Mart stated of its defence of Smith v NationalMoney Mart: "We believe in
the merits of our business practices and in the quality of our products and services. That is why, for
the past five and a half years, we have vigorously defended every allegation.. .and why we intend to
continue to do so throughout this trial": National Money Mart Company, News Release, "Money Mart
Comments on Class Action Trial" (27 April 2009) online: CNW <http://www.newswire.calen/releases/
archive/April2009/27/c54 I 0.html>. The parties ultimately agreed to aS 100 million settlement, subject
to court approval. Money Mart's parent company "admit[ted] no wrong doing," indicating that the
"settlement will allow us to avoid the continuing substantial litigation expense"; Dollar Financial
Corp, News Release, "Dollar Financial Corp Announces Expected Settlement in Ontario Class Action
Litigation" (9 June 2009) online: DFC <http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c= 177357&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1297774&highlight- >.
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or assets, living paycheque to paycheque, on the edges of the financial
mainstream without access to credit, at risk of exploitation by lenders who
were actively evading the law. Frequent payday loan users were even more
vulnerable and at risk of being drawn into a cycle of debt.
The industry responded by pursuing self-regulation and government
regulation. In 2004, it formed what is now the Canadian Payday Loan
Association (CPLA), a self-regulatory body that currently represents
a significant proportion of the industry.34 Its early activities suggest the
CPLA sought to address criticisms of the industry. It commissioned Ernst
& Young to assess industry costs," and it created a Code ofBest Business
Practices (the Code).3 6
Ernst & Young's study determined the industry-wide average cost
(operating and loan capital and bad debt) of a payday loan to be $20.66 per
$100. The weighted average, which factors in market share, was $15.69
per $100. The difference in cost for a large lender and a smaller one was
significant: $16.93 per $100 versus $22.88.3' The report also concluded
payday lenders are dependent "on maintaining a substantial repeat
customer base." 38
While the commissioning of the Ernst & Young report responded to
concerns about loan costs, the Code addressed some of the criticisms about
lending practices and transparency. For example, although it sets no limits
on the cost of borrowing, it does prohibit rollovers, and interest, fees, and
other costs are to be disclosed in plain language.3 9
The CPLA also sought legislative reforms. Indeed, in describing
itself it states it "is not your typical industry association. We're calling for
regulation, not fighting it."4 0 The industry argued section 347 should not
apply to the small, short-term loans they provided and, more particularly,
that it was inappropriate to assess the usurious nature of the loan by
annualizing its cost. They suggested payday loans were designed for
occasional use, not for regular shortfalls in income.
34. CPLA, "Mandate", supra note 12.
35. Ernst & Young, The Cost of Providing Payday Loans in Canada:A Report Preparedfor the
Canadian Association of Community Financial Service Providers (Tax Policy Services Group,
2004), online: Canada Payday Loan Association <http://www.cpla-acps.ca/english/reports/
EYPaydayLoanReport.pdf>.
36. Canadian Payday Loan Association, online: <http://www.cpla-acps.calenglish/consumercode.
php> [CPLA, Code].
37. Ernst & Young, supra note 35 at 29.
38. Ibid at 46. The costs to provide the first loan were 2.68 times higher than for providing repeat or
rollover loans, with first-time loans accounting for 85% of operating costs (at 34).
39. CPLA, Code, supra note 36.
40. Canadian Payday Loan Association, "Welcome to the CPLA," online: <http://www.cpla-acps.cal
english/home.php>.
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The industry presented a very different discourse about borrowers,
challenging their characterization as vulnerable. Instead they argued
borrowers were educated, average Canadians with household incomes
close to the median who took out payday loans for convenience and
flexibility and understood their costs.4' Payday lenders were providing (1)
more choice in the lending marketplace; and (2) a service by lending to
those deemed too high risk by mainstream financial institutions. This risk
in turn justified higher interest rates and fees.
Thus by 2006, when the CriminalCode amendments were introduced,
all sides in the debates were calling for legislative reform and industry
regulation. The next section looks at the legislative debates about the
amendments. In particular it looks at the claims made about the industry
and borrowers, and about how the legislation would protect consumers.
3. Federalresponse: Bill C-26
Bill C-26, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminalinterest rate)4 2
added section 347.1 to the Criminal Code. The section exempts lenders
from prosecution under section 347 for payday loans that meet the
following criteria: (1) they are for $1500 or less; (2) for up to 62 days;
(3) the lender is licensed by a province; and (4) the province has been
designated by Cabinet under section 347.1(3).43 This section provides
(1) that Cabinet shall, at the request of the province, designate it for the
purposes of sections 347.1 and (2), if the province has legislation in place
that "protect[s] recipients of payday loans and that provide[s] for limits on
the total cost of borrowing under the agreements."44
a. Bill C-26 in the House of Commons
Members of Parliament (MPs) did not hear directly from lenders or
borrowers, or those representing them. Instead, speakers referred to
reports and recommendations of a number of organizations including
the CPLA, PIAC, and the Consumers' Association of Canada (CAC). At
the committee stage, the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and
Technology (House Standing Committee) called senior staff with the
Departments of Industry and Justice as witnesses.
The governing Conservative Party, and the opposition Liberal
and New Democratic (NDP) Parties supported the Bill, while the Bloc

41. CPLA, "What is a payday loan?", supra note 14.
42. SC 2007, c 9.
43. Criminal Code, supra note I at s. 347.1(2).
44. Ibid at s 347.1(3).
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Qu6b6cois (Bloc) did not. 45 Debate reflected the competing schools of
thought about payday loans. Some of the Bill's supporters pointed to the
need for regulation to protect vulnerable consumers from unscrupulous
lending practices and costs. Others supported it because it would provide
certainty, security, and legitimacy to payday lenders.
Regardless of their perspective, a recurring theme from supporters
was that the industry's existence and rapid growth justified its regulation.
In introducing the legislation, the Minister of Justice stated that "the bill
is about providing greater protection to Canadians. It is about enabling
the regulation of an industry which, for better or for worse, has come
to occupy a very real place in Canadian cities and towns." 46 Or as Tony
Martin, a New Democrat put it, "if these payday loan operations are going
to exist, and it looks like they will for a while, let us at the very least make
sure they are regulated." 47
MPs subscribing to the market demand school saw the industry as
simply responding to consumer demand and a market gap. They pointed
out that the CPLA "ha[d] been very forthcoming in lobbying for a bill
to protect consumers" 48 to "give their industry both legitimacy and long
term viability." 49 Lenders, they argued, faced the risks of loan default
by high risk customers and potentially bankrupting class action suits.s0
The amendments opened the door for provincial regulation, would assist
consumers "to function in fair and efficient markets,"' and protect lenders
who were responding to consumer demand.
Those who supported the amendments, but were more critical of
the industry did not agree that its growth should simply be understood
as "evidence [it] is fulfilling an otherwise unmet need for short term
credit and/or convenience." 52 Nor did they understand borrowers to be
unconstrained in choosing a loan product. Instead they were vulnerable
consumers: "individuals who are basically forced to use these services
45. House of Commons Debates, 39th Parl, Ist Sess, No 104 (6 February 2007) at 6496 (Results of
Third Reading Vote).
46. House of Commons Debates, 39th Par!, Ist Sess, No 068 (24 October 2006) at 4814 (Hon Vic
Toews).
47. House of Commons Debates, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, No 104 (6 February 2007) at 6431.
48. House of Commons Debates, 39th Parl, Ist Sess, No 068 (24 October 2006) at 4200 (Brian
Murphy).
49. House of Commons Debates, 39th Parl, Ist Sess, No 077 (6 November 2006) at 4772 (Blaine
Calkins).
50. House of Commons Debates, 39th Parl, Ist Sess, No 103 (5 February 2007) at 6382 (Ken
Boshcoff).
51. House of Commons Debates, 39th Parl, Ist Sess, No 077 (6 November 2006) at 4763 (Colin
Carrie).
52. House ofCommons Debates,39th Parl, Ist Sess, No 103 (5 February 2007) at 6422 (Paul Szabo).
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are the ones who can least afford to pay these high fees. Maybe they
need the dollars to provide food, buy groceries... Maybe they need the
dollars for a medical bill or maybe they even need the dollars to pay the
minimum payment on a high interest bearing credit card."53 As one MP
noted, "Anybody who is prepared to pay effectively a 60% interest rate
on a cash advance clearly has no credit and no options."5 4 In opposing the
bill, the Bloc argued the amendments were an "underhanded means to
help people who have difficulty getting a loan to get money from payday
lenders. ... [L]enders have put pressure on the government to legalize their
existence.""5 There was also discussion about the fact that mainstream
financial institutions had vacated the marketplace for small, short-term
loans. Opposition MPs suggested Parliament encourage them to re-enter
the market voluntarily or through legislative means.5 6
There was surprisingly little discussion of two key issues. The first
was that the amendments would effectively permit lenders to charge
criminal interest rates. The second was the criteria, if any, that would be
used to decide if a province seeking designation under section 347.1(3)
had legislation in place that "protected" borrowers. It was not until the
committee stage that it was clearly stated that the amendments would
permit payday lenders to charge what would otherwise be criminal interest
rates: "[c]ertainly we're talking about provinces regulating these payday
lenders and allowing them to charge more than 60%.. .The exemption
is necessary so that they can allow them to charge more than 60%.""
Although the discussion about interest rates was initiated by a Liberal MP,
it was largely Bloc MPs who objected to the idea that lenders would be
able to charge rates above 60%.8
The Bloc raised the issue again during third reading, with one MP
noting the CAC objected to the legislation because it would not protect
consumers from high interest rates, and the CAC "believe[d] that the
industry [was] calling for this amendment for its own benefit."" A few
MPs, largely from the NDP, skirted the point by focusing on provincial

53. Ibid at 6383 (Hon Wayne Easter).
54. Ibid at 6422 (Paul Szabo).
55. Ibid at 6417 (Robert Vincent).
56. See, e.g., ibid at 6384 (Pat Martin), 6386 (Paul Crete); House of Commons Debates, 39th Parl,
Ist Sess, No 104 (6 February 2007) at 6428-30 (Tony Martin), 6436 (Brian Murphy).
57. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology (INDU),
Evidence, 39th Parl, Ist Sess, No 38 (12 December 2006) at 4 (William Bartlett, Senior Counsel,
Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice).
58. Ibid at 4 (Paul Crte).
59. House of Commons Debates, 39th Parl, Ist Sess, No 104 (6 February 2007) at 6431-32 (Nicole
Demers).
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regulatory powers. For example, in response to criticism the NDP was
supporting criminal interest rates, Judy Wasylycia-Leis stated "[t]he
situation is quite the opposite. We reject the idea that we should simply
talk about a 60% interest rate.. .We are simply saying that we would like
the federal government and the provinces.. .to agree that they will put
aside the criminal rate of interest.. .when a province has a better system to
manage this area. "60
However, public servants indicated that "[t]here's really no intent
here for the federal government to pass on the adequacy of the provincial
legislation." 6 1 There were to be few, if any, criteria attached to the
requirement that the provincial regulatory scheme "protect recipients of
payday loans" beyond limits on the costs of borrowing. Yet all parties
supporting the legislation appeared confident in the provinces' ability to
create regulatory schemes that would protect consumers, curtail industry
practices that had attracted criticism, and set a reasonable ceiling on
payday loan costs.
b. Bill C-26 in the Senate
While Senate debate echoed many of the questions and concerns raised in
the House of Commons, senators were more clearly focused on the fact that
the anendments could permit licensed lenders to charge interest of more
than 60% APR. There was also considerable discussion of what "protect"
meant in the context of the proposed section 347.1(3) requirement that a
province seeking a designation have legislation in place that "protects"
payday loan borrowers. Senators were concerned that there were virtually
no criteria to provide guidance to cabinet in deciding whether to designate
a province. 62 Senators also delved more deeply into why mainstream
lending institutions were not providing the kinds of loans sought by
payday loan borrowers.
Much of the discussion took place at the committee stage. In addition
to the civil servants who had appeared before the House Standing
Committee, the Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce
(Senate Standing Committee) called representatives from mainstream
financial institutions, the payday loan industry, the FCAC, the Competition
Bureau of Canada (the Competition Bureau), the Ombudsman for Banking

60. House of Commons Debates, 39th Parl, Ist Sess, No 103 (5 February 2007) at 6414.
61. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology (INDU),
Evidence, 39th Parl, Ist Sess, No 38 (12 December 2006) at 5 (William Bartlett, Senior Counsel,
Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice).
62. See, e.g., Senate, Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Evidence, 39th Parl,
Ist Sess, No 16 (28 February 2007) at 22-27.
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Services and Investments, and the CAC as witnesses. It also heard from
former Senator Madeleine Plamondon who had sponsored an earlier,
unsuccessful bill to regulate payday loans.6 1
Some senators and witnesses opposed permitting costs above 60%
APR. They argued the amendments offered little protection to vulnerable
consumers and gave government little influence over the rate(s) provinces
set." Others indicated they were "not prepared to force an industry into
losing money [and that] [t]his industry came about.. .to meet the needs of
the little people and people who are willing to pay." 6 When asked what
a "fair, reasonable and appropriate cap" 66 for a $100 loan would be, the
CPLA suggested $20, although it indicated it would not necessarily see a
cap of up to $30 as excessive.67 The CPLA stressed the need for a cap high
enough to encourage competition while "protect[ing] consumers from
companies that will gouge them with high fees." 68
Competition was a central theme of the presentation from Rentcash
Inc., a national payday lending company. It argued the Bill would reduce
competition and create monopolies. It proposed amendments to ensure that
"transparency, competition and consumer choice [would be] preconditions
of provincial designation," 69 and monopolies avoided. Although Rentcash
did not favour rate caps, its witnesses acknowledged the public pressure
on governments to set them. When pressed, its vice-president suggested
an appropriate cost ceiling would be one that matched its current fee
structure, $21.60 per $100."
Senators consulted staff with the Competition Bureau about whether
the legislation would encourage monopolies in one or all the provinces."
The Competition Bureau indicated that although it generally preferred to
leave product pricing to the market, this approach did not appear to be
working. Despite the number of payday lenders, loan costs continued to be
63. Bill S-19, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, 1st Sess, 38th Parl, 2004.
64. See, e.g., Debates of the Senate, 39th Parl, Ist Sess, vol 143, No 76 (28 February 2007) at
1854 (Hon Sen C6line Hervieux-Payette, Leader of the Opposition), and the evidence of Madelaine
Plamondon and representatives from the CAC. Senate, Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and
Commerce, Evidence, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, No 16 (1 March 2007) at 41-53; Senate, Standing Committee
on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Evidence, 39th Parl, Ist Sess, No 17 (21 March 2007) at 30-36.
65. Senate, Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Evidence, 39th Par!, 1st Sess,
No 16 (1 March 2007) at 45 (Hon Sen W David Angus).
66. Ibidat 69.
67. Ibid at 70 (Stan Keyes). A cost of $21 for a $100 loan over 14 days is 521% APR. At $30 it is
782%.
68. Ibid at 66.
69. ibidat 73 (Michael Thompson, Vice-President, Rentcash Inc).
70. Ibidat 75, 82-83.
71. Senate, Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Evidence, 39th Par!, Ist Sess,
No 16 (28 February 2007) at 32 (Hon Sen Jerahmiel Grafstein).
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high, causing public concern and suggesting a problem within the payday
loan market. Given the current market situation, the Competition Bureau
did not object to the Bill and noted the Competition Act would continue to
apply to the industry.12
Other senators on the Senate Standing Committee appeared to share
a similar view-that although the free market was the best means for
allocating resources, when it was not working, the state needed to get
involved. This is captured nicely in the following remark by the Chair:
"I believe in the competitive model, but that presumes a question of free
choice in a free marketplace. However, when choice is limited, the wicked
arm of the government has to reach out and try to protect consumers as
best we can.""
The Senate Standing Committee also discussed why the services
payday lenders provided were not available from mainstream financial
institutions. In this context it consulted with Alterna Savings, a credit
union in Ontario, about its work in assessing whether it could provide
some of the products currently offered by payday lenders.74
In the end, despite concerns about its inability to ensure provinces
enacted legislation with sufficient levels of consumer protection, and
the possibility of a patchwork of provincial regulatory schemes, the
Senate Standing Committee recommended the Bill be passed without
amendments because it did not want to unduly delay legislation that
would protect vulnerable consumers." It urged provinces to ensure their
legislation included measures to limit rollovers, resolve complaints, ensure
full disclosure of loan terms, follow reasonable debt collection processes,
and provide a rescission right no later than the end of the day after the
loan had been taken out. The Senate Standing Committee also expressed
concern about the "lack of involvement by chartered banks in short-term,
low-value-lending," urging them to enter the marketplace for such loans. 6
The Senate went on to approve the Bill.

72. Senate, Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Evidence, 39th Part, Ist Sess,
No 17 (21 March 2007) at 9 (Colette Downie, Acting Deputy Commissioner, Competition Bureau of
Canada), 13 (David McAllister, Senior Advisor, Competition Bureau of Canada).
73. Ibid at 29 (Hon Sen Jerahmiel Grafstein).
74. Senate, Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Evidence, 39th Parl, 1st Sess,
No 16 (1 March 2007) at 55 (Norman Ayoub, Senior Vice-President, Chief Operating Officer, Alterna
Savings).
75. Senate, Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Observations to the
Fifteenth Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce (Bill C-26),
39th Part, 1st Sess, No 20 (19 April 2007) 9 at 9.
76. Ibid at 10.
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c. Provincialreaction
To date, all the provinces except Qu6bec and Newfoundland have enacted
legislation regulating payday loans, although not all have proclaimed it in
force. Generally speaking, the legislation and regulations contain provisions
relating to disclosure, licensing, borrower cancellation rights, rollovers,
extensions, renewals and replacements, and the holding of concurrent
loans. They permit the respective licensing agencies to investigate
complaints, ensure compliance, and levy fines. The legislative schemes
also place limits on the interest and other fees that can be charged."
One area where there is significant variation is in the process for setting
the limits on the costs of borrowing. In the majority of provinces, Cabinet
sets it." In some of these jurisdictions, governments have conducted
consultation processes before finalizing the legislation and setting the
maximum costs. 9 Three other provinces, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick
and, initially, Manitoba, delegate the task to their respective public utilities
boards." Two of the boards, the MPUB and the NSUARB, have held public
hearings and issued decisions setting the maximum costs of borrowing
and recommending further legislative amendments. 8 ' In addition to being
the first jurisdictions to establish limits on borrowing costs, they set the
lowest and the highest caps to date: with Manitoba's limit of $17 per $100,
and Nova Scotia's of $31 per $100. Such a difference seems surprising,
particularly since they were imposed by administrative bodies experienced
in setting rate caps and balancing consumer and business interests in the
process.
The next section takes a closer look at the narratives about the industry,
borrowers, and the purpose(s) of the regulatory schemes in the hearings
and decisions. The divergence in the maximum costs of borrowing ordered
appears to stem from the fact that the MPUB and subsequent provincial

77. For a comparison of provincial regulatory regimes see Stephanie Ben-Ishai, "Regulating Payday
Lenders in Canada: Drawing on American Lessons" (2008) 23 BFLR 323 at 335-42, 360-66, 370-76
(Current to 8 April 2008); NSUARB 2011, supra note 9 at para 45.
78. See, e.g., Business Practicesand Consumer ProtectionAct, SBC 2004, c 2, s 112.02, as amended
by Business Practices and Consumer Protection (Payday Loans) Amendment Act, SBC 2007, c 35;
Payday Loans Act, 2008, SO 2008, c 9, ss 32(2), 77(23).
79. In British Columbia, for example, the Ministry of Public Safety and solicitor general issued a
consultation paper and requested responses to questions about a number of issues including disclosure
and total borrowing costs. Ministry of Public Safety and solicitor general, Consultation Paper:
Regulation ofpayday lenders under the Business Practicesand Consumer ProtectionAct (Victoria:
Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 2007).
80. MCPA 2006, supra note 8 at s 164; NSCPA, supra note 8 at s 18T; Cost of Credit DisclosureAct,
SNB 2002, c C-28.3 Part V.1, Div F, s 37.47; as amended by An Act Respecting Payday Loans, SNB
2008, c 3. New Brunswick's legislation is not yet in force.
81. Maximum Charges,supra note 3; 2008 NSUARB 87 [NSUARB 2008].
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government decisions respond to the more vulnerable borrower at risk
of industry exploitation presented by consumer groups and other critics.
In contrast, the NSUARB decision centres around an average borrower
making a sensible choice in a moment of unexpected financial need, and an
understanding of the payday loan industry as filling a gap in the consumer
credit market. The analysis focuses on the submissions and decisions with
respect to (1) the appropriate methodology for setting borrowing costs; (2)
the maximum costs of borrowing; and (3) additional recommendations to
government about the regulatory schemes.
II. Provincialregulatory responses: Manitoba and Nova Scotia
1. Manitoba Public Utilities Boardhearing: November 2007-February
2008
At the time of the MPUB hearing, the provincial Consumer Protection
Act (MCPA) required it to set the maximum cost of credit for a payday
loan as well as the maximum costs for (1) a loan renewal or extension;
(2) a replacement loan; or (3) on default. 2 The MPUB was given a broad
mandate to consider a number of factors in making an order that was
"just and reasonable in the circumstances"" including: lender expenses
and revenue, their financial risks, the circumstances of borrowers and
other credit options available to them, and any factors or information it
considered to be relevant and in the public interest.84
Its decision-making process included four months of public hearings.
It heard from eight interveners, seven of whom were from the payday
lending industry: the CPLA, four payday lending companies, a lender to
payday lenders, and a payday loan insurer. The eighth was a coalition of
consumer organizations (the Coalition) comprised of the CAC (Manitoba),
the Manitoba Society of Seniors, and Winnipeg Harvest, a food bank. The
MPUB also heard from a number of presenters who asked, or were asked, to
attend. They included payday loan users, researchers, and representatives
from social service agencies and the industry.' The hearing process was
characterized by the Coalition as unique and without "Canadian regulatory
precedent."86
The MPUB's decision includes summaries of the presentations and
the interveners' submissions and recommendations, along with its own
82. MCPA 2006, supra note 8 at s 164(2).
83. Ibid at s 164(5).
84. Ibid at s 164(4).
85. For more information about the process and the parties see Maximum Charges, supra note 3 at
4, 70-75.
86. Quoted in ibidat 119.
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findings, recommendations and order. The competing schools of thought
about payday loans and borrowers thread through the submissions and the
MPUB decision. As the MPUB was actually setting the maximum costs
of borrowing, there was more attention to competition, choice and ratesetting than there had been during the Parliamentary debates.
a. Submissions
i. Approach to regulation
The Coalition argued the provincial payday loan market was not
adequately protecting consumers. It noted that although a number of
lenders competed for business in the "unregulated" market, costs were still
very high particularly in comparison to other forms of unsecured credit.
Borrowers frequently held concurrent or continuous repeat loans, and
lenders' disclosure of costs and loan terms was inadequate." Moreover, the
market was not sufficiently competitive, was concentrated in urban areas,
and dominated by two companies." The Coalition suggested the MPUB
ground its decision in an "efficiency model" which balanced consumer
protection with a fair rate of return for efficient lenders. 9 It was confident
there were "opportunities for efficiencies within the current players in the
marketplace.""
Generally speaking, industry representatives submitted that regulation
was needed to legitimate the industry and protect it from the risks of class
action suits and the difficulties in recovering debts that had existed under
the previous Criminal Code provisions.9 1 They submitted MPUB should
focus on encouraging competition and discouraging market concentration.
Some representatives took the position that the industry was already
operating competitively, 92 while others argued the market was not fully
competitive because some lenders were unwilling to enter the market
because of the current risks. This meant fewer lenders were responding
to consumer demand for payday loans. These lenders could raise prices
"without losing significant market share" and there was little incentive
to reduce loan prices. 93 Once regulations were in place, the market would
expand to full competitive capacity. 94

87. Ibidat 125-26, 143-44.
88. Ibidat 127, 133-34.
89. Ibid at 140 quoting the Coalition submissions.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibidat 117.
92. See, e.g., ibid at 198.
93. Ibidat 161 quoting 310-Loan.
94. See, e.g., ibid at 159, 190, 194.
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All of the industry interveners argued it was important that the
regulatory scheme, including the rate caps, not interfere significantly
with the market and rejected the Coalition's "efficiency model." Some
cautioned against state paternalism in setting a rate cap designed to
influence consumers' choices about how to spend their money.95 The
CPLA argued that as new lenders entered the regulated market, lenders
would be under greater pressure to become more efficient.96
The industry argued its growth was simply a market response to
consumer demand and that it expanded the panoply of lending options
available to the well-informed consumer." This consumer was the one
presented by the industry throughout the regulatory debates: a middleclass, educated, average working Canadian who understood their options.
If they took out a payday loan, they had made a choice that should not be
examined closely since people should be allowed to make poor choices."
The Coalition and a number of the presenters took issue with
this explanation for the industry's growth and its assertion that it was
founded on consumer choice. The Coalition suggested that "instead of
payday lending maximizing consumer welfare, ... payday lenders may

be reinforcing underlying economic inequality. And that's a particularly
key concept when we look to the demographic of repeat borrowers." 99
They placed use of payday loans within a larger social and economic
context of increasing income inequality, stagnating wages and assets, and
rising debt to income ratios.'00 This was compounded by reduced access
to mainstream financial services. The low- to middle-income earners the
industry targeted were particularly affected by these economic changes
and the industry was exploiting them.'0 '
The Coalition noted that borrowers were more vulnerable than
the average Canadian and they "tend[ed] to be younger, less educated,
in larger families and have lower family income." 02 Repeat borrowers
were even more vulnerable.'10 This understanding of the payday borrower

95. See, e.g., Assistive Financial and Sorenson's Loans in ibid at 157, 174.
96. Ibid at 194.
97. See, e.g., ibid at 186, 189.
98. See, e.g., ibid at 174 quoting Sorenson's Loans.
99. Ibid at 124.
100. 31O-LOAN also cited these developments in explaining the growth in demand for payday loans.
Ibid at 160.
101. Ibidat 82-97, 122-24.
102. Ibid at 124 quoting the Coalition.
103. Ibid at 124-25.
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as particularly vulnerable was also central to many of the presenters'

submissions.104
ii. Maximum costs of borrowing
The maximum costs of borrowing recommended ranged from the $15
per $100 borrowed proposed by the Coalition for all loans including
extensions and renewals,'"0 to Rentcash's proposed $37.50 per $100. The
CPLA made the lowest industry proposal of $23 per $100.106 In the event
of default, the Coalition proposed a maximum charge of 1% or 2% per
week.' 0 In contrast, Rentcash recommended 59% interest on default and
for extensions or renewals, along with inflation indexation for the cap.'"0
The CPLA recommended a maximum fee of $40 plus 60% interest in the
event of default. 09
The Coalition argued that current rates should not be determinative
because the industry was not operating efficiently."0 It disagreed with
industry submissions that the spread in costs simply reflected the range
of risks associated with the loans. Instead it suggested that such a range
would not exist in a competitive market and was not reflective of the
spreads found in the mainstream financial services industry."' In keeping
with its recommendation that the MPUB take an efficiency approach to
regulation, the Coalition stressed that the industry's costs should not be the
only consideration. It acknowledged its recommended rate would likely
result in some companies closing or leaving the province, but argued "the
fact that less efficient companies may not be able to continue.. .does not
necessarily mean.. .the rate is not just and reasonable."" 2 It suggested a
lower cap would put pressure on lenders to become more efficient." 3
Industry interveners rejected the Coalition's submissions, arguing
its proposals would result in many payday loan companies ceasing
operations. They presented a variety of arguments and rate proposals.
Generally, they encouraged the MPUB to set rates that would encourage
a viable and competitive market."l 4 Most industry interveners appeared
to propose costs that were similar to the ones they already charged. Their
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.

See, e.g., ibid at 78-80.
Ibid at 154.
For a summary of the various proposals see ibid at 116-17.
Ibid at 152.
Ibid at 198-200.
Ibid at 174, 193.
Ibid at 133 quoting the Coalition.
Ibid at 136.
Ibid at 145.
Ibid at 117.
See, e.g., ibid at 163.
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submissions stressed the fact that the government, in choosing to regulate
the industry, had signalled that "payday lending should be treated as a
legitimate enterprise,""' and had accepted that lenders had to charge what
would otherwise be criminal interest rates. They argued that the range of
loan costs in the industry, and in their recommendations, reflected the risks
associated with the loans. They suggested the provincial government's
intent was to only prohibit higher, more extreme rates charged by other
payday loan companies,11 6 although it is not clear what constituted an
"extreme rate."
iii. Additional recommendations

The MPUB was also empowered to make recommendations about all
"matters in respect of payday loans and lenders,""' and its decision
outlines some additional recommendations that were put forward. The
Coalition suggested limiting the percentage of a borrower's income that
could be subject to a payday loan and extending repayment periods."'
It also made a number of recommendations about the content and form
of the information to be disclosed to borrowers before they take out a
loan. Key recommendations included the provision of written and verbal
information about loan costs and terms, as well as an opportunity to review
the information independently before taking out a loan. The decision
indicates the Coalition also made suggestions about internet lending but
does not provide details.' '9The industry interveners appear to have focused
their submissions on the costs of borrowing. The MPUB decision does
not delineate specific recommendations, although it notes suggestions for
regular data collection from one industry intervener. 120
b. BoardDecision-OrderNo. 39/08
The MPUB set the maximum cost of borrowing on a sliding scale. The
industry could charge up to 17% of the loan's value on the first $500, plus
15% on loan amounts from $501 to $1,000, and 6% on amounts between
$1,000 and $1,500. The maximum cost of borrowing for borrowers
receiving income assistance or employment insurance was set at 6%, as
was the cost for loans that were more than 30% of the borrower's next pay
(net). All mandatory charges and interest were to be included in calculating
the total cost of borrowing. The MPUB also fixed the maximum charge
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

]bid at 176 quoting the CPLA.
See, e.g., ibid at 177, 199, 210.
MCPA 2006, supra note 8 at s 164(12).
Maximum Charges, supra note 3 at 154.
Ibid at 147.
Ibid at 169. For a summary of suggestions from social agencies see ibidat 80-81.
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for an extension, replacement, or renewal loan at a one-time charge of 5%.
Default charges were set at $20 plus 2.5% non-compounded interest per
month. 121
The MPUB also made a number of recommendations to government
aimed at increasing consumer protection. These included encouraging
the government to (1) look at ways to facilitate short-term, small loan
provision by mainstream financial institutions such as credit unions and
banks 2 2; (2) license payday lenders not currently covered by the regulatory
scheme-internet and telephone lenders 23 ; and (3) pursue harmonization
through nation-wide caps on the costs of credit.124
In reaching its decision, the MPUB situated its deliberations within a
number of conclusions about the statutory regime. It found that in passing
the legislation, government had signalled (1) that the industry had a role in
the province's financial service sector and (2) that it accepted consumers
would pay borrowing costs above 60%. At the same time, the government
had chosen to act paternalistically and regulate a market that was not
providing sufficient protection to consumers. Thus the main purpose
of the legislation was consumer protection.'25 Accordingly, the MPUB
concluded "the maximum charges to be set for payday loans should
be such as to reduce the cost of credit for consumers while promoting
increased efficiency within the industry."' 26
The maximum borrowing costs it ordered were below the industry
recommendations, but higher than the Coalition's recommendation, at least
for the first $500.127 The MPUB considered a lower cap, but determined
setting it at or below 60% APR ($0.16 per $100) would not be sufficient
for efficient lenders to operate. It acknowledged that some lenders would
be unable to continue operations or would need to restructure,128 but
found there was "no public interest reason supporting inefficient payday
lending." 29 The MPUB did not understand its mandate as requiring it to

121. Ibid at 260-61.
122. Ibid at 234-35, 253.
123. Ibid at 253-54.
124. Ibidat 254. Although the Board acknowledged that the regulatory changes were an improvement,
it expressed concern that provincial regulation was likely to lead to a "hodge-podge of lender practices,
laws and risks across Canada, a situation not in the best interest of either consumers or the industry."
Moreover, lenders would not benefit from efficiencies that could come with national standards. Ibid at
222-23.
125. Ibidat 227.
126. Ibidat217.
127. A cost of S17 per $100 (17%) had been recommended by a Coalition expert. Ibid at 152-54.
128. Ibid at 233, 244-45.
129. Ibid at 228.

Conceptions of Borrowers and Lenders in the Canadian
Payday Loan Regulatory Process

465

set maximums that would allow the continued viability of all industry
business models.' 30
In contrast to the parliamentarians debating the Criminal Code
amendments, some of whom had characterized the industry as in need of
legislative protection, the MPUB was largely critical of lenders and their
practices. Indeed, its findings begin with the observation that the industry
had initially "flouted" the Criminal Code before seeking regulation to
"legitimize" and protect it.' 3 '
The MPUB accepted that many borrowers had near average incomes,
steady employment, the ability to access cheaper forms of credit, and
deliberately chose to take out a payday loan.' 32 However, the borrowers
at the centre of its deliberations were more vulnerable. They had below
average incomes and were living paycheque to paycheque without savings
or credit to help them cope with unexpected expenses such as car repairs,
illness, or unemployment. The MPUB was particularly concerned about
the evidence that many borrowers used payday loans on a monthly basis.
It was this more vulnerable subset of payday loan borrowers that it saw
as at risk of exploitation and bankruptcy. 3 The MPUB was upfront about
the fact it hoped to discourage rollover and replacement loans by making

them less lucrative.134
This attention to more vulnerable borrowers also helps explain the
MPUB's decision to implement a sliding scale approach to the costs of
lending. The Coalition and one of its witnesses had presented this option
but noted it created more complexity. 35 This complexity was one of the
reasons industry interveners had objected to it. They also argued that
lenders would respond by increasing costs for smaller loans and providing
multiple smaller loans rather than one larger loan.' 6
c. Subsequent Developments
The CPLA applied to have the MPUB review its decision. Cash Store
Financial Services Inc. (Cash Store), which had appeared at the hearing as
Rentcash, applied to the Manitoba Court of Appeal for leave to appeal the
decision. In its review decision, the MPUB deleted one element of Order
39/08 that it agreed was already provided for in the legislation and denied
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Ibid at231.
Ibid at 154.
Ibid at 192, 216.

466 The Dalhousie Law Journal

the rest of the CPLA's application.' It also considered the grounds of
Cash Store's appeal to the MCA, varied its order to make it clear that the
maximum costs applied to all mandatory charges and interest, and decided
it was not appropriate to suspend its order pending the decision.'
The MPUB reiterated its view that the legislation's purpose was
consumer protection and more particularly that "[i]t is not the single or
very occasional user of a payday lender that the Board...seeks to protect
with the maximums...but the frequent borrower that the payday lending
industry depends upon."' In short, it was the borrower most at risk of
being pulled into a cycle of payday loan debt that was at the centre of its
deliberations. At the same time, the Board noted its expectation that payday
lending would continue once the maximums were in place, and suggested
that the legalization of payday lending at rates above 60% would reduce
lender costs.14 0 In January 2009, the Manitoba Court of Appeal granted
Cash Store leave to appeal and stayed the MPUB's order until the appeal

was heard.141
Rather than wait for the appeal decision, the provincial government
passed legislation rescinding the MPUB's original order, and amending
the MCPA so that the maximum costs of borrowing would be set by
regulation.142 The legislation also included additional consumer protection
measures, some of which had been recommended in the MPUB Order.
These included bringing internet loans within the regulatory scheme, and
limiting the percentage of a borrower's next pay cheque that lenders could
advance.' 43 The Finance Minister explained that government felt it could
not wait for the appeal decision since "the industry remains effectively
unregulated in many of their practices, and payday borrowers remain at
risk." 4 4 In an echo of the MPUB's interpretation of its mandate, he stated
that "[t]he need to regulate this industry to safeguard consumers has always
been our government's driving motivation in creating and implementing

the legislation."
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The Minister also indicated that given MPUB's extensive hearing
process, the government would be "treating [the MPUB order] as
consultation, advice, and recommendations." 46 The amendments also
require the MPUB to conduct a review within three years of the first
regulation setting the maximum costs of credit coming into force. This
review must include a public consultation and consider the maximum
costs for loans, extension, renewal or replacement loans, and on default.
The MPUB must report its recommendations about these costs and any
other recommendations to government. 4 1
In April 2010, the government set the maximum borrowing cost for
all payday loans at the rate the MPUB had ordered for payday loans up to
$500, namely 17% of the principal.' 4 8 The government also set the same
rate, 5%, the MPUB had ordered for extension, replacement or renewal
loans,14 9 as well as the same rate and charges for default.5 0 It did not adopt
a sliding cost scale, nor did it set reduced maximums for those receiving
income assistance or employment insurance. It went further than the
MPUB had in restricting loans to 30% of the borrower's net pay rather
than reducing the costs of loans above 30%,'' and limiting the cost that
could be charged for payday loans taken out within seven days of repaying
another loan to 5%.152
d. Summary
Although the MPUB, and later the provincial government, set maximum
borrowing costs that would, absent the federal and provincial regulatory
framework, amount to criminal interest rates, they were attentive to
the vulnerable borrower at the heart of critiques of the industry and its
practices. The MPUB decision included clear, enforceable measures to
assist more financially vulnerable and repeat borrowers. It set the maximum
borrowing costs on a sliding scale. It also set lower borrowing costs for
those receiving employment insurance or income assistance, renewing,
extending, or replacing existing payday loans, or borrowing more than
30% of their next pay cheque. Although the government declined to
implement a sliding scale or reduced loan costs for those not employed,
it took its cue from the MPUB in setting what is to date the lowest cap
on borrowing costs in the country. It also followed the MPUB in setting
1I46.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
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significantly lower costs for renewal, extension, or replacement loans. In
addition, the government's decision to regulate online lending (one of the
MPUB recommendations), limit the percentage of a borrower's net pay
that can be borrowed, and reduce the costs for back-to-back loans are all
measures that assist more vulnerable and repeat borrowers.
The next section looks at the rate setting process in Nova Scotia. The
contrast between Manitoba's maximum costs and those set in Nova Scotia
appear to be reflective of the NSUARB's somewhat different understanding
of the borrower, the industry, and the regulatory regime's purpose.
2. Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board hearing:January,March, &
July 2008
Nova Scotia's Consumer Protection Act (NSCPA) gives the NSUARB a
mandate virtually identical to the MPUB's original one.' In particular, it
has the same broad mandate to make an order that is "just and reasonable in
the circumstances,"' 5 4 and permission to consider the same factors.'5" The
NSUARB's decision-making process was not as extensive as the MPUB's
process with only five days of public hearings. It granted intervener status
to seven parties. Five were from the industry: the CPLA and three lending
companies; and Assistive Financial Corp., "a privately held company that
provides loan capital to borrowers through The Cash Store outlets."' 56
The remaining two were the provincial agency Service Nova Scotia and
Municipal Relations (SNSMR), which administers the legislation, and a
Consumer Advocate appointed by the province. The NSUARB also held an
evening session for those who were not interveners to make submissions.
Credit Counselling Services of Atlantic Canada (CCSAC) and the Nova
Scotia NDP Caucus both made presentations.5
Like the MPUB, the NSUARB had to determine the maximum costs
of borrowing and make recommendations about regulatory reform. Its
decision includes a discussion of payday loans and borrower demographics
and a summary of the submissions with respect to its "Final Issues List"
and questions, along with its findings on each. Analyzing individual
submissions is somewhat hampered by the fact that, in contrast to the
MPUB decision, the NSUARB does not summarize the presentations and
recommendations separately. Although the decisions refer to individual
submissions, it is not always clear which party submitted the evidence
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the NSUARB ultimately relied on.' It is clear though that, as with the
submissions to the MPUB, the competing schools of thought about the
industry and borrowers were articulated in the submissions considered and
inform the NSUARB's decision.
a.

Submissions

i. Approach to regulation
Industry interveners disagreed about the methodology the NSUARB should
use to determine the maximum costs of borrowing. The CPLA submitted it
should take a "cost-plus" approach which incorporated operating, capital,
and bad debt costs plus a reasonable rate of return.'" While counsel
collectively representing The Cash Store and Assistive Financial Corp.
(together referred to as "Rentcash") argued that a cost approach, which
is often used by utilities boards to set prices in monopoly situations,
was not appropriate because the provincial payday loan industry was
not a monopoly.160 Instead Rentcash advocated a "less intrusive" market
approach, which focused on eliminating the barriers keeping lenders from
entering the payday loan market.' 61 Once these barriers (risk of class
actions, regulatory uncertainty) were eliminated and the market properly
competitive, lenders would not be able to charge excessive fees for payday
loans. The provincial SNSMR also supported a market approach. In its
view "attempting to establish a precisely calculated maximum cost...
would be extremely difficult, time consuming and costly." 62
The Consumer Advocate argued the NSUARB did not have enough
evidence about industry costs and rates of return to apply any methodology,
but agreed with the CPLA that a "cost-plus" approach was more appropriate
for setting a "just and reasonable" rate than a market approach because it
ensured that lenders did not earn excessive returns.'16
ii. Maximum costs of borrowing
As for the maximum costs of borrowing, data indicated lenders in Nova
Scotia were generally charging between $20 and $35 per $100, with one
lender charging $15.164 Industry submissions generally reflected the costs
they were already charging. Rentcash submitted first that the costs should
158. In some instances I have looked at individual submissions to clarify a party's position on a
particular point.
159. Ibid at paras 90, 98.
160. Ibid at paras 91-96, 113.
161. Ibid at para 91 quoting Clinton Rebuttal Report.
162. Ibid at para 114 quoting SNSMR ClosingSubmission.
163. Ibid at paras 97-100.
164. Ibid at paras 130, 142, 144, 145.

470 The Dalhousie Law Journal

be left to the market, but if the NSUARB did set a maximum, it should
be slightly more than $35 per $100 to include the upper range of current
rates and accommodate increased regulatory costs.'65 Dr. Kevin Clinton,
a Rentcash witness, suggested the initial rate should be based on those
already being charged in the "current, unregulated market."' 6 6 It could be
revised in subsequent reviews to reflect prices in a competitive regulated
market.
310-LOAN suggested a slightly lower $27 per $100, and argued the
existing range simply reflected the variety of business models, credit
risks, and operating costs in the industry.167 The CPLA made the lowest
industry proposal: between $20.60 and $23.60 per $100, plus "an amount
to account for inflation and regulatory costs." 68
Neither the Consumer Advocate, nor the SNSMR suggested a
particular rate. The Consumer Advocate argued the rate should allow only
the "lowest cost" and most efficient lenders to continue operating.' 69 The
SNSMR's position again mirrored that of Rentcash. It suggested the rate
should "[accommodate] existing payday lenders, except for any that are
exceptionally higher than the norm."170 And finally, a consultant retained
by the NSUARB suggested a cost somewhere between $23-$27 per $100
would both promote competition and discourage extreme rates. All the
interveners appear to have assumed and accepted that on default, the
maximum interest rate that could be charged on the amount outstanding
would be 60% APR. 7'
iii. Additional recommendations
The NSUARB also asked for submissions about recommendations to
make to government.'72 While 310-LOAN argued it should not make any
recommendations before the lending market adjusted to the regulatory
scheme,'17 a Rentcash witness recommended borrowers be able to
determine the total cost of borrowing without having to first give personal
information.174 Rentcash counsel submitted loan agreements should have
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to include contact information for both the lender and the Registrar of
Credit for borrower questions and complaints.'"
Consumer advocates made more substantive recommendations focused
on borrower vulnerability. CCSAC representatives made a number of
suggestions including giving borrowers options to extend a loan repayment
period to 60 days or to repay a loan in instalments; encouraging those who
default to get credit counselling; and restricting loan principal to 25% of the
next paycheque (net).17 6 The Consumer Advocate supported many of these
recommendations and suggested there be a "cooling off' period before a
borrower could take out another loan."' And finally, the provincial NDP
Caucus recommended that costs for repeat loans be lower than those for
first-time loans to reflect their reduced costs for lenders; there be a limit
on the number of payday loans a borrower could take out annually; and
standardized and limited personal information requirements."'
b. Board Decision-2008NSUARB 87
The NSUARB set the maximum cost of borrowing at $31 per $100.
Default charges were set at $40 plus a maximum interest rate of 60% APR
on the arrears.' 79 The NSUARB decided that at future reviews it would
require data from lenders on the number of payday loans, their average
amount and the number of defaults, and it scheduled a review of its order
in two years.s 0
It also made three recommendations about amendments to the draft
Regulations presented at the hearing. It recommended they require that:
(1) lenders file annual data on the number of loans, their size, and the
number of defaults with the registrar; (2) borrowers be able to know the
total cost of borrowing without first submitting any personal information
other than their name; and (3) the loan agreement include information
about how to contact the lender and the Registrar of Credit in the event of
questions or complaints.''
The NSUARB reflected on the regulatory regime and its own
mandate, finding that in enacting legislation, both the federal and
provincial governments had accepted borrowers would pay more than
60% APR for payday loans.'82 Although it determined the intent of the
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provincial legislation was to protect borrowers,' it disagreed with the
MPUB's interpretation of its similarly worded mandate as tasking it with
setting maximum borrowing costs that would only permit efficient lenders
to continue operating. Instead, it held "the maximum cost of borrowing
should accommodate a variety of lenders which offer different products
and services to borrowers (for example, servicing borrowers with different
levels of risk)."' 8 4 Further, it decided it should apply a market approach to
setting the maximum costs, as "competition [is]... the most effective control
on the cost of borrowing."' The NSUARB agreed with submissions that
the provincial payday loan market was competitive,'16 and that competition
would only increase once regulation was in place.' This in turn, it held,
would provide appropriate consumer protection.' As the NSUARB held
that the Nova Scotia market was already competitive, it determined that
the maximum costs should reflect those charged by the "mainstream" of
lenders. This would protect borrowers from excessive charges and ensure
they continued to have access to a range of loan products.' 89
The borrowers at the centre of the NSUARB's decision were average
payday loan borrowers, rather than the more vulnerable borrowers at the
centre of the MPUB's decision. These borrowers were the ones the industry
presented throughout the regulatory debates. They earned above average
incomes, had "at least some post-secondary education,"' 9 0 and "are willing
to pay, and content to pay, charges which, if calculated on an annualized
basis may be in the hundreds or even thousands of per cent."' 9' They
were choosing to do so for a variety of reasons including convenience
in terms of time and paperwork; privacy; and, in some cases, because
traditional lenders' fixed costs made such a small loan more expensive in
the mainstream financial sector.' 92
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19 1. Ibid.
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In its recommendations to government about legislative amendments,19 3
the NSUARB rejected the recommendations made by those representing
consumers. Instead it generally agreed with 310-LOAN's submission that
it allow the payday loan market to adjust to the new regulated environment
before making additional recommendations.194 In the NSUARB's view,
competition coupled with the enhanced disclosure requirements in the
legislation would provide adequate consumer protection for the average
payday loan borrower at the centre of its deliberations.'9 5 Its decision
to schedule an early review was designed to ensure the market was
functioning competitively. 9 6
3. Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board hearing-November2010
The NSUARB conducted its review of the 2008 Order in November
2010. It granted four parties intervener status: the CPLA, The Cash Store
(formerly known as Rentcash), the SNSMR, and a Consumer Advocate
appointed by the board. During an evening session, it also heard from the
CCSAC, the Anglican Church of Canada, and the Nova Scotia Government
Employees' Union.19
a.

Submissions

i. Approach to regulation
None of the parties suggested the NSUARB abandon the market approach
for setting the maximum costs, although it noted that "certain aspects of
the evidence and submissions made on behalf of the Consumer Advocate
could be seen as amounting to an implicit adoption of at least certain
aspects of the cost approach."' 98
ii. Maximum costs of borrowing
The NSUARB "received sharply differing views" about whether it should
maintain the maximum cost of borrowing at $31 per $100.19 Evidence
before the NSUARB indicated the cost of borrowing in the province ranged
from $16 to $31 per $100, with the average cost having declined from
$24.34 in 2008 to $23.21 in 20 10.200 Although the decision does not set
out their positions, all the industry interveners argued the maximum cost
193. All these recommendations were subsequently accepted by government and incorporated into
the regulatory scheme. See Payday Lenders Regulations, NS Reg 248/2009, ss 5(a), 5(d), 9(3).
194. NSUARB 2008, supra note 81 at para 230.
195. Ibid at paras 136, 150, 177, 184, 212, 259, 276.
196. Ibid at para 214.
197. NSUARB 2011, supra note 9 at paras 24-37.
198. Ibid at para 50. The CPLA had originally advocated a cost approach.
199. Ibid.
200. Ibid at para 42. As witnesses for the Consumer Advocate noted, this was not a weighted average.
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should not be changed.20 ' The Cash Store, which had increased both its
market presence (from 12 outlets to 23), and the cost of borrowing (from
$27 to $31 per $100) since 2008, focused its submissions on the need
for a variety of loan products in a competitive market so that consumers
would have sufficient choice.2 02 This variety in turn explained the range
of borrowing costs in the provincial market. The Consumer Advocate on
the other hand, argued the cost of borrowing should be reduced to $21 per
$100,203 which corresponded to that recently set in Ontario.
Concerns were also raised about the practice of some lenders to
sell optional life, employment, or illness insurance. The Cash Store, for
example, offered it at a cost of 2.5 to 3% of the loan. 204 The Anglican
Church argued such insurance should be banned and a witness called by
the Consumer Advocate suggested the risk of an average 25-35 year old
borrower "dying, or being injured, or losing his or her job in the brief twoweek life of the loan, can be taken to be very small." 20 5
In terms of the fee and interest rates on default, the CPLA and The
Cash Store submitted they should remain unchanged at $40 and 60%
respectively. 20 6 The Consumer Advocate noted that Nova Scotia's fee and
interest rate were higher than in some other provinces,2 07 but does not
appear to have suggested they be reduced.
iii. Additional recommendations
Disclosure
All the interveners appeared satisfied that existing disclosure requirements
were adequate, with the Consumer Advocate suggesting only that
amendments ensure all lender advertising include loan costs.2 08
Repeat loans
The NSCPA prohibits rollovers, 209 "the extension or renewal of a loan that
imposes additional fees or charges on the borrower, other than interest,
or the advancement of a new payday loan to pay out an existing payday

201. See 2011 NSUARB 22 (Final Submission by CPLA at 2, 7; Final Submission by The Cash Store
Inc. at p 13), Matter ID M02633, online: <http://www.nsuarb.ca/index.php?option=com-content&tas
k=view&id=73&Itemid=82>.
202. NSUARB 2011, supra note 9 at para 97.
203. Ibid at paras 53, 55.
204. Ibid at para 178.
205. Ibidatpara 181.
206. Ibid at paras 117, 121.
207. Ibidat paras 117-18.
208. Ibidat para 131.
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loan...." 210 Lenders are permitted to offer loan extensions or renewals
so long as they only charge interest. Evidence at the hearing however,
indicated that larger lenders were not offering extensions or renewals.
Instead, they would issue back-to-back loans; providing a new loan as
soon as an earlier one was paid.
The legislation also does not prohibit concurrent loans from different
lenders, and it was not a general practice for lenders to inquire about
whether consumers had loans with other payday lenders.21 ' Submissions
from the public, including the CCSAC, raised concerns that "repeat
loans" 2 12 and concurrent loans from multiple lenders trapped borrowers in
a cycle of debt.21 3
The Consumer Advocate recommended lenders be required to do "a
more searching inquiry into the ability of [potential borrowers] to repay
their loans, including whether [they] have a current loan with another
payday lender" 2 14 and be prohibited from issuing a loan if this were the
case. 2 15 Lenders should also be prohibited from issuing a new loan on the
same day an earlier loan is repaid, and until the cheque for the previous
loan has cleared. 2 16 He suggested Nova Scotia follow British Columbia in
limiting the amount a lender can require be repaid in a single pay period
when the borrower has taken out more than two loans in a 62-day period.217
And finally, he suggested the NSUARB recommend the Regulations be
amended to require the collection of data on repeat loans.218
Online lending
At the time of the hearing, Nova Scotia was the only province not regulating
online lenders. Industry interveners supported including them within the
legislative scheme in order to regulate all payday lending business models
and protect consumers. Inclusion of online lending, they argued, would
also give lenders more choice in designing their business and increase the
variety of loans available to consumers.21 9 The CPLA suggested that Service
Nova Scotia conduct a consultation process to determine the appropriate
regulations, 2 20 while the Consumer Advocate identified a number of issues
210.
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the NSUARB needed to consider before making recommendations, and
suggested that Service Nova Scotia "review the implications of allowing
payday lenders to provide [online] loans."22 '
b. BoardDecision-2011 NSUARB 22
The NSUARB reduced the maximum cost of borrowing to $25 per $100222
and included the cost of any loan insurance in the cost. 223 It did not change
the maximum default charges and interest rates.2 24 The NSUARB also
recommended the Regulations be amended to require the disclosure of
payday loan costs in all advertising. 225 Otherwise it found existing disclosure
requirements to be adequate.22 6 With respect to "repeat loans," it ruled there
was not enough evidence to justify prohibiting them or imposing a waiting
period between loans. It did recommend the Regulations be amended to
require lenders to submit data on repeat loans. 227 It also indicated it would
be recommending that online lending be regulated, and gave the parties
thirty days to provide written submissions before it issued a supplementary
decision with more detailed recommendations. 228
Discussion
The NSUARB decided to continue using a market approach to determine
maximum costs. 2 29 In arriving at the $25 figure, the NSUARB looked
at industry costs and profits, noting that a variety of studies showed the
average cost of payday loans ranged from $21 to $27 per $100.230 It also
commented on the fact that despite the high costs of payday loans, profit
margins appeared to range from a loss to approximately 17 per cent. 231 The
NSUARB compared this with Statistics Canada profit data showing the
average profit margin for all Canadian industries was 8.8 per cent, with the
margin for financial and insurance industries averaging 26.4%.232 Although
it expressed concern with the incompleteness of the data, the NSUARB
221. lbid at para 154.
222. Ibid at para 114.
223. Ibid at para 185.
224. Ibid at paras 119, 124.
225. Ibid at para 133.
226. Ibid at para 134.
227. Ibid at paras216-17.
228. Ibid at paras 164-66. Its supplementary decision, 2011 NSUARB 58, recommends online lending
be subject to essentially the same fee and disclosure requirements as payday lending out of "bricks
and mortar" outlets. See para 65 for a summary of the recommendations. In October 2011 Service
Nova Scotia stated that the province would consider legislation to regulate online payday loan lenders
pursuant to the May recommendation of the NSUARB.
229. NSUARB 2011, supra note 9 at para 51.
230. Ibid at paras 68, 106.
23 1. Ibid at para 57.
232. Ibid.
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found the payday loan industry was not "a particularly profitable one,"233
and certainly less profitable than the mainstream financial sector.234
This finding was consistent with the 2009 report of the Maximum
Total Cost of Borrowing Advisory Board for the Ontario Payday Lending
Industry (the Ontario Report), which recommended a maximum cost of
borrowing of $21 per $100.235 The NSUARB found that the Ontario Report
recommended $21, not because industry profits were too high, or the
payday loan market uncompetitive, but because the Advisory Board had
sought to eliminate loans to high risk borrowers, 23 6 and to "reduce 'product
differentiation'."237 The NSUARB recognized that industry critics as well
as a Consumer Advocate witness supported reducing costs and limiting
the range of payday loan products. 238 However, it found most payday
loan borrowers were satisfied with their loans, and that this satisfaction
was due in part to the variety of products and services available to them:
"product differentiation is.. .an important factor in the surprising (to many
observers, at least) satisfaction that borrowers have with payday loans,
whether the rate is lower...or higher." 239 Its support for competition and
consumer choice is also apparent in its recommendation to include online
lending in the regulatory scheme. The NSUARB indicated that, in its view,
regulation would not only address its concern about a regulatory gap, it
would encourage competition and provide more choice for consumers.2 40
The NSUARB considered the range of loan costs in Nova Scotia
(between $16 and $31) and delved into The Cash Store's recent increase
to the $31 maximum when it began giving borrowers a free MasterCard
with their loan.24 ' These kinds of cards are generally sold as an additional
product for approximately $18 to $20, and cost lenders $5.242 Although not
explicitly critical of this practice, the NSUARB did note the Consumer
Advocate's criticism of its "use.. .to justify [the cost increase]," 243 and
indicated testimony by The Cash Store's president "seemed to suggest that
if his Company ceased providing [it] as an included service, its rate could
be reduced to its former level of $27 or below." 244
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The NSUARB found as "reasonable inferences" that the federal and
provincial legislative regimes sought to ensure the availability of (1)
payday loans throughout the province, and (2) a wide range of product
choices to satisfy borrower demand.24 5 Thus, the maximum cost of lending
could not be so low that it reduced or eliminated lending in rural areas
where lenders would have higher unit costs, 24 6 or eliminated services
"which some borrowers seem to like and are willing to pay for." 247 That
said, the NSUARB was not convinced the maximum cost of borrowing
should remain at $31 per $100 and reduced it to $25.248
Without further explanation for the $25 figure, it is difficult to know
how the NSUARB arrived at it. It is within the $21 to $27 range of lender
costs and at the upper end of the range being charged before The Cash
Store increased its charges. Thus it can be understood to be directed at
The Cash Store's practice of providing MasterCards without damaging the
lender's presence in rural Nova Scotia. The reduction to $25 also seems
unlikely to reduce product differentiation, choice, and competition in the
payday loan market, three goals that underpin the NSUARB's approach to
payday lending regulation. It was clearly not its intent to reduce the cost
or availability of payday loans to higher risk and more vulnerable repeat
consumers. Moreover, even with this reduction, Nova Scotia continues
to have the highest maximum cost of borrowing amongst provinces
regulating payday loans.
Although it adopted a market approach, it also understood the
legislative regime to impose a duty "to intervene in the market approach
where it considers it appropriate to do so."'249 It did so in deciding to include
optional insurance costs within the costs of borrowing. The NSUARB's
analysis of the practice is also the only part of its decisions to date in
which it has been openly critical of lender practices.250 The NSUARB
agreed with the submissions about the slim chances of the insured event
occurring during the loan period.25' It also found that the cost of insurance
was disproportionate to the loan amount.25 2 Although the NSUARB had
initially thought it would prohibit the practice, it ultimately decided
instead to allow it provided the charges were included in the total cost
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of borrowing. 253 Although interventionist, in declining to ban the sale of
payday loan insurance the NSUARB remained true to its philosophy of
encouraging choice, competition, and product differentiation within the
payday lending market.
On the issue of repeat and concurrent loans, the decision indicates
these practices received strong criticisms from the Consumer Advocate
and participants who worked with payday borrowers. 254 Despite these
submissions, and the fact that the practices have been criticized by
consumer groups throughout the regulatory process, the NSUARB ruled
it would not intervene in current lender practices to offer back-to-back
loans or the ability of borrowers to hold concurrent loans from different
lenders as it did not have adequate evidence about how any restrictions
or prohibitions would be implemented, and whether they would actually

succeed. 255
The NSUARB also pointed to survey data prepared for the CPLA
indicating borrowers did not support government limits on the number of
loans they could take out or the prospect of lenders sharing information
about borrowers. Those surveyed indicated a payday loan should be
available whenever it was needed.256 The NSUARB did decide that more
information was needed about the extent of repeat loans and recommended
amendments to the Regulations requiring annual filing of data on "the
number of repeat loans, the number of customers who have taken out
repeat loans, and the number of repeat loans taken out by individual
customers."257
One could understand the NSUARB as simply being cautious here
about intervening in the market, preferring to gather more data before
recommending changes. However, given the strong critiques it heard
on behalf of consumers and the fact that other provinces have stronger
regulatory protections aimed at these practices, the decision can also
be understood as according with the NSUARB's focus on regulatory
protection for the average payday loan borrower, and on encouraging
market competition and choice. This is particularly so given that the
NSUARB's recommended data collection amendments will not, if
implemented, provide information about the extent of the holding of
concurrent loans from multiple lenders.
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Ibid at paras 175-76, 184-85.
See, e.g., ibid at paras 141-44.
Ibid at para 146.
Ibid at para 145.
Ibid at para 147.
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The borrower at the centre of the NSUARB decision was similar to
the one at the centre of its 2008 decision and is consistent with the market
demand school on payday loans. The one represented by the "vast majority"
of borrowers: well educated with income levels "not much out of line with
the income distribution of working class and middle [class] Canada," 258
who was making an informed choice when taking out a payday loan.
Conclusion
Throughout the federal and provincial regulatory processes discussed in this
paper, decision-makers heard, considered, and articulated two divergent
perspectives on the industry and borrowers-the "market demand" and the
"exploitative" schools of thought. When assessed together, the regulatory
regimes better reflect the market demand perspective. At the federal level,
the Criminal Code amendments legitimize the industry and ensure its
viability by permitting licensed lenders in a designated province to charge
what would otherwise be criminal interest rates. Despite some supporters'
(and opponents') concerns about the need to protect more vulnerable
borrowers at risk of being drawn into a cycle of payday loan debt, the
amendments provide little criteria for Cabinet to use in deciding whether
a provincial legislative scheme "protects" borrowers for the purposes of
designation, other than lender licensing and a cap on borrowing costs. 259
At the provincial level, the Manitoba and Nova Scotia governments
chose to regulate the industry and seek a cabinet designation. Although
the provincial legislative schemes limit or prohibit rollovers-one of
the most frequently criticized lender practices-they are largely focused
on licensing and disclosure. This emphasis on disclosure accords with
a market demand understanding of the industry since it aims to ensure
borrowers can make an informed choice in a competitive market. And
while these provinces currently have the lowest and highest borrowing
costs, both are still well above the criminal interest rate in recognition of
the fact that the industry could not operate if it was restricted to charging
rates below 60% APR.260
And yet a closer examination of the cost-setting decisions in Manitoba
and Nova Scotia suggests that perspectives on borrowers, the industry,
and the purpose of the regulatory scheme do matter. Even within a larger
regulatory framework that reflects a market demand approach to payday
lending, the focus of the decision-maker affects the outcomes. Hence
the marked contrast between the decisions in the two provinces in terms
258. Ibid at paras 93-94 quoting the evidence of Dr Clinton.
259. Criminal Code, supra note I at s 347.1(2)-(3).
260. See, e.g., Maximum Charges, supra note 3 at 233.
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of the interpretation of similarly-worded mandates, the approaches to
regulation, the costs set, and the responses to recommendations aimed at
more vulnerable borrowers, particularly repeat borrowers.
Finally, this exploration of these regulatory processes also suggests that
despite the divergent schools of thought on payday loans, the regulatory
schemes that emerged could have responded to both perspectives by
more fully responding to the evidence presented, and concerns raised,
about vulnerable, repeat borrowers at risk of exploitation. For example, in
Nova Scotia, limits on the percentage of a borrower's net pay that can be
borrowed and lower costs for repeat loans could have been implemented
or recommended in concert with the other measures. In both provinces,
additional initiatives such as data collection on repeat and concurrent
loans, and the creation of a payday loan database could have been
recommended or more fully explored. At the federal and provincial levels,
efforts could have been made to encourage mainstream lenders to find
ways to offer payday loan-like products, as was recommended by the
Senate Standing Committee and the MPUB. 2 6 1 The federal government
could have investigated the CAC's recommendation that a new small loans
act be introduced. 26 2 As more provincial regulatory schemes become fully
operational and undergo periodic reviews, it will be interesting to see the
ways in which they reflect and adapt to respond to both schools of thought
and types of borrower.

261. Ibid at 220-21, 229, 242-43. For a recent discussion of ways in which mainstream financial
institutions could provide services currently offered in the AFS, and some of the challenges to doing
this, see Bowles, Dempsey & Shaw, supra note 3 at 3, 45-47.
262. Senate, Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Evidence, 39th Parl, 1st Sess,
No 17 (21 March 2007) at 30-31 (Mel Fruitman, Vice-President, Consumers'Association of Canada).

